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<DOC>
<docHead>
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<title>The Production and Revision of (Disciplinary) Genres</title>
<version n="1" date="2016-08-22"/>
</docHead>
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<fsb_rpt>
<page type="ttl">
<title>Feasibility of a Voting Machine Test Suite</title>
<contributors>
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</contributors>
<date>8/16/2016</date>
</page>
<page type="tbl_contents">
<sect n="1" lvl="1"> Executive Summary </sect>
<sect n="2" lvl="1"> Preliminary Requirements Analysis </sect>
<sect n="3" lvl="1"> Feasibility </sect>
<sect n="4" lvl="1"> Success Criteria </sect>
<sect n="5" lvl="1"> Cost Estimates </sect>
<sect n="6" lvl="1"> Risk Analysis </sect>
<sect n="7" lvl="1"> Conclusion </sect>
</page>
<page type="exec_sum"> In the course of the 2016 elections, certain candidates have
expressed concern about voter fraud. Although voting machines are currently built
according to voluntary certifications and tested by accredited laboratories, these
processes do not take into account the social and administrative factors involved in
running a voting precinct. Therefore, a field testing suite has been proposed to get a
fuller understanding of the entire voting architecture. <pb/> For reasons explained in
the following report, it is currently infeasible for the Election Assistance Commission
to move forward with this project. </page>
<page type="pre_req_ana">
<app_ovr type="obj">There have been various demonstrations of weaknesses in the security
of current voting systems, primarily in labs. The Election Assistance Commission has
the opportunity to demonstrate the security or lack thereof of voting systems in the
field. To that end, a set of tools and procedures could be developed to test various
polling locations nationwide. </app_ovr>
<app_ovr type="rls">Depending upon how the suite is designed to be used, its
implementation will likely require extensive cooperation from state governments
where the suite is used. It may also require legislation from congress.</app_ovr>
</page>
<page type="fsb">
<fsb_hlgt type="tcnl">The testing suite will need to work with many different voting
machines. Beyond a basic plan, there is uncertainty on whether any work can be
reused between them. Also, the suite will need to be flexible enough to incorporate
new machines as they are produced. Beyond these problems, the development of the
suite should be possible with standard computer security techniques.</fsb_hlgt>
<fsb_hlgt type="suits">There will likely be legality problems with testing the security
at the actual polling places and times. The only way around this is likely a change in laws passed at the
federal and possibly even state levels. Due to the current gridlock in congress and
the varying makeups of state governments, it is very unlikely that the EAC will be
able to deploy the testing suite with any sort of uniformity nationwide.</fsb_hlgt>
<fsb_hlgt type="econ">The EAC likely does not have the financial flexibility to support
this project. With its budget of ten million dollars already being used for other
important and required functions, and with congress unlikely to allocate more money
in the foreseeable future, it is highly unlikely the EAC will be able to find the
money for a new major project. As it is the EAC is only capable of supporting about
30 full time equivalent workers</fsb_hlgt>
</page>
<page type="sccs_crt">
<req_sect>Versatility <req>The test suite must be compatible with all currently used
voting machines</req><req>The test suite must be adaptable to the different types of locations and setups
of polling places</req></req_sect>
<req_sect>Adaptability <req>The testing suite must be flexible enough to adapt to new
types of voting equipment</req></req_sect>
<req_sect>Reporting <req>The results of the security tests must clearly describe any
vulnerabilities so they can be monitored and fixed</req></req_sect>
</page>
<page type="cost">
<est type="inst">If the EAC goes forward with this project, I do not foresee any major capital costs. Instead, the
major cost will be labor. Some of this work can likely be handled by existing
employees. This could have a negative impact on their other responsibilities. </est>
<est type="fnc">It is unlikely that existing workers can handle the increase in tasks by
themselves, so new full and part time workers will need to be hired. This could cost
a significant amount of money depending on wage rate and how many people end up
being hired.</est>
</page>
<page type="rsk_ana">The major risk of using a testing suite on the actual election
infrastructure is that a bad actor could use the tools to commit election fraud. This
could be mitigated by redoing all the polls in locations that were tested. There are
major downsides to that solution though, as it would be very burdensome on governmental
resources and would almost certainly decrease final voter turnout.</page>
<page type="conc">
<fsb>In this researcher's opinion, a field based testing suite would be highly
infeasable. There would be major obsticals in legality, coordination, and monetary
cost. In return there would be a minimal improvement over current labratory and
specification based testing.</fsb>
<cond>If a large amount of political will to
complete this testing program manifests itself uniformly across the United States,
the EAC could move forward with this project.</cond>
<sum>I reccomend scrapping this project and looking
into other ways to improve current testing.</sum>
</page>
</fsb_rpt>
</DOC>